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Abstract: We consider a market with three competitors, two of which decide to 
cooperate.  Firms first choose capacity under demand uncertainty then compete in 
quantities after the uncertainty has been resolved.  We specify strategic alliance (SA) 
as an agreement where two airlines jointly choose capacity and divide it among 
themselves.  Contrary to the full merger case, after demand is revealed the alliance 
members market their capacity shares independently.  Our main result is that the 
profit of the cooperating firms is greater under SA than under full merger. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, increased cooperation among airlines has been a major trend in the air 
transport sector.  Full mergers, code-sharing agreements and block-seat sales are 
examples of the variety of cooperation forms that have been used by airlines.  The need 
for cooperation arises mostly from the desire of major airlines to a) offer a global service, 
b) increase service quality, c) exploit size economies, and d) gain market power.
3   
  In this paper we admit from the outset that, for some or all of the above reasons, 
airlines desire to cooperate and examine if there is an economic reason for them to prefer 
forming a strategic alliance (SA) rather than to proceed with a full merger.  By SA we 
mean situations of partial cooperation, where firms cooperate on some decisions but act 
as competitors on others.  SA formation is usually attributed to i) regulations preventing 
foreign airlines for providing domestic services or owning national carriers, and ii) the 
fact that “the investment required to develop an efficient global service network is 
perhaps prohibitively large, even for major airlines.”
4   While considering the above 
factors as being very important, we show that strategic reasons may also enhance the 
desirability of SA.  Interestingly, the effect underlined in this paper could also explain the 
strategy by Air France and KLM in trying to maintain some independence despite their 
recent merger.
5   Lufthansa has also recently adopted such a strategy following its 
acquisition of Swiss. 
We consider a market with three competitors, two of which decide to cooperate.  
The general structure of the model is analogous to Barla and Constantatos (2000 and 
2005).  Firms first choose capacity then compete in quantities.  Capacity being a longer 
run decision it is taken under uncertainty over the state of demand while the seat sales 
decision is taken after the demand state has been revealed.  In this paper, we specify SA 
as an agreement where two airlines jointly choose capacity and divide it among 
themselves according to some rule.  Contrary to the full merger case, after demand is 
                                                           
3 According to Oum et al. (2000) cooperation allows i) expansion of seamless service networks (i.e., avoid 
changing airline); ii) traffic feed between partners; iii) cost efficiency (economies of scale, scope and traffic 
density); iv) increased service quality; v) marketing advantages (pooling of frequent flyer programs, CRS 
display) 
4 Oum et al. (2000). 
5 This strategy has been coined “one group, two airlines”.   - 3 -
revealed the alliance members market their capacity shares independently.  Our main 
result is that the profit of the cooperating firms is greater under SA than under full 
merger. 
As is well known, a two-firm merger in a Cournot triopoly, while successful at 
raising the price, it turns out to be detrimental for the profit of the merged firms.  By 
internalizing part of the effect a firm’s quantity decision has on rival profits, the merged 
entity sets its quantity more prudently, thus yielding market share to the outside firm who 
now acts more aggressively.
6  
When instead of merger the cooperating firms form a SA then the above effect 
disappears, since for given capacity choices the allied airlines will act as aggressively as 
the outside firm.  This change in attitude, while of no importance in states where the 
cooperating firms are capacity constrained, becomes important in low demand states 
where capacity is not binding. In those states, the SA members will market their capacity 
more aggressively.  This implies that in the capacity stage, the SA’s reaction function is 
located outwardly relative to the reaction function of the merged entity.  Equilibrium 
capacity of the cooperating firms is, therefore, higher under SA than under merger and 
the opposite holds true for the outside rival. 
While the cooperating airlines do better by forming a SA than merging, they still 
make less profit compared to acting separately.  The latter conclusion can be easily 
reversed when joining forces allows for synergies and cost reductions.
7  If SA and merger 
confer similar cost reductions, the former becomes the first best solution in terms of 
profit maximization.  It also dominates the merger in terms of social welfare.  
The existing literature on airline strategic alliances is limited but growing. Park 
(1997) and Oum, Park and Zhang (2000) analyze the effect of airline alliances on traffic 
levels, fares, and welfare, distinguishing between complementary and parallel alliances. 
The former refer to cases where firms link up their existing networks to build a larger 
one, while the latter to collaboration between firms competing on the same routes.  It is 
                                                           
6 See Salant et al. (1983) and Tirole (1989).  While the merger succeeds to increase price, the market share 
losses of the participating firms are sufficiently large to counterweight any such benefits. In strategic terms, 
the merged firms adopt a soft attitude (“fat cat”) while competition takes place in strategic complements.   
7 As a matter of fact, the cooperating firms also make less profit than their independent rival.  Sufficient 
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shown that complementary alliances are likely to increase welfare while parallel alliances 
to decrease it.  
Brueckner (2001) distinguishes two types of markets, the inter-hub and the 
interline markets, where a passenger needs to use two companies in order to complete his 
trip, even in the pre-alliance situation.  It shows that an alliance tends to reduce (increase) 
fares in the interline (inter-hub) and suggests that the positive effects of alliances may 
outweigh any negative impacts. 
Flores-Fillol and Moner-Collonques (2004) examines whether airlines that 
employ the same hub have an incentive to create a complementary alliance.  It concludes 
that complementary alliances are profitable only for a sufficient degree of product 
differentiation, but may nevertheless be formed as prisoner’s dilemma outcome even 
when product differentiation is not enough.  In a situation where the allied airlines and 
their rival can choose whether to be the leader in a price game with product 
differentiation, Lin (2004) shows that the leader’s identity is parameter-dependent.  Chen 
and Ross (2003) studies an alliance where an incumbent accepts to provide access to its 
facilities to a newcomer.  It shows that, even if the alliance increases total market surplus 
above the pre-alliance level, it may be socially detrimental by forestalling a more 
substantial form of entry.  Lin (2005) also shows that a strategic alliance may deter entry 
by acting as a commitment device. 
In all the above papers no comparison is made between SA and full merger.  
Considering alliance as a joint venture for an intermediate product, Morash (2000) shows 
how contractual terms about transfer prices and profit sharing may serve as an 
appropriate commitment device yielding the alliance Stackelberg-like leadership 
advantages over the outside firms.  Forming a strategic alliance may therefore be superior 
to full merger.  Zhang and Zhang (2005) develops a two stage model of competition 
between two alliances each formed by two partners linked by demand complementarities.  
In the first stage, alliance partners decide on the degree of internalization by a partner of 
its impact on the other partner’s profit.  In the second stage, alliances are competing in 
quantities.  In this setting, internalizing demand complementarities has not only a direct 
positive impact but also improves the alliance strategic position by making it “tougher”.  
They therefore find that partners have an interest to opt for complete cooperation.     - 5 -
Section 2 presents the model, section 3 and 4 present the main results and section 
5 concludes. 
 
2. The Model 
Let us have two cities A and B. The air-transport market between them (market AB) is 
currently served by three airlines. Airlines 1 and 2 contemplate either forming a strategic 
alliance or merging in which case the emerging company, airline M, competes against 
airline 3.  The SA differs from merger in that the partners join forces only in deciding the 
choice of total capacity and its allocation between them. Once individual capacities are 
decided, the two partners become rivals in selling AB tickets. 
  The three carriers are players in a three-stage game. At stage 1, firms 1 and 2 
decide on the nature of their relationship: merger or SA. At stage 2, firms make their 
capacity choice. Whether merger or SA, firms 1 and 2 make their capacity decisions 
jointly. Stages 1 and 2 are played under demand uncertainty. At stage 3, the demand state 
is revealed and firms compete in quantities, with potentially binding capacity constraints.  
  To keep the analysis tractable a) we assume the demand on AB to be  Q P − =α , 
where P is price, Q is total quantity and the parameter α  follows a uniform distribution 
on the support [] 1 , 0 ; b) we rule out any product differentiation among airlines.
13 
On the cost side, we assume that the capacity costs supported in stage 2 are the 
only cost element. Hence, the marginal cost associated with serving an extra passenger in 
stage 3 is zero up to capacity.  This is consistent with the observation that, in the airline 
industry, most of the operating costs are associated with offering a seat rather than 
serving a passenger.
14 
Concerning the capacity cost, we introduce a very simple structure that allows us 
to focus on demand and strategic considerations.  We assume that: i) all airlines face 
similar cost; ii) the per unit capacity cost (i.e. the cost of offering one seat) is independent 
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14 In other words, once a seat has been added to capacity, its cost is the same whether a passenger flies on it 
or not. The analysis could easily be extended to include a positive marginal cost in stage 3.   - 6 -
of the number of seats carried on a route and equal to c,  2
1 0 ≤ < c .  We restrict c to values 




3. The Case of Merger 
Airlines 1 and 2 form a single entity M that chooses total capacity as well as quantity.  
The subgame examined in this section is a two-stage duopoly between symmetric 
airlines, M and 3. A superscript M indicates equilibrium values in this subgame.   
   
Lemma 1: When airlines 1 and 2 merge,  ( ) 3 2 1 3 c K K
M M
M − = = , while 
() ( )
2 3
3 2 4 6 1 27 1 c c
M M
M ⋅ + − = Π = Π . 
 
 Proof: Let us assume that both players have already chosen capacities with  j i K K ≤ , 
3 , , M j i =   j i ≠ . Define  i M K 3 1 = α ,  j i M K K 2 2 + = α .  There are three possibilities according 
to the realization of α . First, when  ] , 0 ( 1M α α ∈  the demand is very low none of the firms 
is constrained.  The Cournot solution is  , 3 α = = j i q q   3 α = P .  Second, when 
] , ( 2 1 M M α α α ∈  (intermediate demand states) firm i is constrained while its rival is not.  
The Cournot solution is  i i K q = ,  ( ) 2 i j K q − = α , and  ( ) 2 i K P − = α .  Third, when ] 1 , ( 2M α α ∈  
(high demand states) both firms are constrained with  i i K q = ,  j j K q = , and 
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It is straightforward to show (proof available by the authors) that the only equilibrium 
involves the symmetric capacity choices and profits described in the lemma, QED. 
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There is no much to comment on the merger case. Each of the merged firms 1,2, 
collects half the duopoly profit.  Since the two firms act in a fully coordinated manner, 
the way they split capacity, hence profits, is irrelevant for the market outcome.  
 
4. The Case of Strategic Alliance 
In this section, firms 1 and 2 form a strategic alliance defined as an agreement where 
partners a) jointly choose capacity in order to maximize total expected profit, b) share 
this capacity equally among themselves,
16 c) market their capacity share independently.  
This implies that market structure in the third stage is triopoly, potentially an asymmetric 
one. A superscript A indicates equilibrium values in this subgame.     
 
Lemma 2: When airlines 1 and 2 form a strategic alliance, unless c is too small (i.e., 
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Proof: Since we have assumed a 50% capacity-sharing rule among alliance members, 
2 2 1 A K K K = = .   We need to examine two cases according to whether  3 2K KA ≤  or 
3 2K KA > .  We only present the former since it turns out to be the only equilibrium.  
Therefore, as α  increases, each alliance partner becomes capacity constrained before the 
outside firm.  Define  A A K 2 1 = α ,  3 2 2K KA A + = α , which divide the realizations of α  into 
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while the outside firm maximizes 
                                                           
16 This division could be viewed as the result of a Nash bargaining outcome where the two airlines have 
identical bargaining power.   
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Solving the system of first order conditions and substituting optimal capacities into the 
profit functions yields the expression in the lemma.  Notice that  0006 . 0 ≤ ∀c  the second 
order conditions for the maximization of (5) are not met, which creates a discontinuity in 
the reaction function of firm 3.  We simply ignore this case since it has no special 
interest, QED. 
   With the two lemmata at hand, we proceed to show 
 
Proposition 1: A strategic alliance is preferable to merger as a means for the 
participating firms to collaborate, while the outside firm prefers that its competitors 
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M A
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A Π − Π  difference for all the admissible values of c.  The 




A Π ≥ Π . Similarly, 
figure 2 reports the 
M A
3 3 Π − Π  difference, which is positive  ( ] 5 . 0 , 0006 . 0 ∈ ∀c , QED.  
 
The intuition behind the results in proposition 1 is straightforward.  Merging 
makes the last stage reaction of the joining partners softer, thus yielding market shares to 
the outside firm.  To see this clearly let first M A K K = 12 K = , so  1 1 1 α α α = = A M , and compare 
profits in demand states where neither the alliance, nor the merged firm is capacity 
constrained.  From the first integrals in (2) and (4) it is obvious that the alliance performs 
better in terms of partner’s profits.  This happens since  ] , 0 [ 1 α α ∈ ∀  capacity choices are 
irrelevant and the allied partners behave like unconstrained Cournot triopolists.  We find, 
therefore, the well know result of Salant, et al. (1893): when firms compete in strategic 
substitutes a merger reduces the total profit of the participating firms.  Hence, preferring 
alliance to merger has a first strategic effect related to third stage outcome and stemming 
from low demand states. 
Now assume also that whether merger or alliance the outsider’s capacity is fixed 
at  3 3 K K = .  It is easy to show that ( )
()
( )
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preferring alliance to merger increases the cooperating firms’ marginal profit due to   - 9 -
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A K K −  difference and shows that it is 
positive for all the admissible values of c.   This means that the alliance’s total capacity 
exceeds that of the merged firm, therefore, whenever constrained, the alliance partners 
have in total a larger market share than their merger counterpart.  This holds true 
independently of whether the outside firm is capacity constrained.  These results also 




We have shown that, in the presence of demand uncertainty airline alliance dominates 
merger in terms of profits as a form of cooperation.  Strategic alliance is therefore not 
necessarily a second best solution justified by regulation limiting airline mergers.  In the 
model presented here, had the two firms remained independent they would have obtained 
higher profits This is due to the fact that, in order to keep matters simple we have ruled 
out any cost synergies.  Obviously, by allowing for sufficient cost synergies one can find 
situations where cooperating yields higher profits than remaining independent.  Since the 
intuition developed in this paper is unaffected by the presence of such synergies, the 
superiority of alliance over merger is robust when the two forms of cooperation provide 
similar cost reductions. Obviously, it remains to be verified whether a strategic alliance 
allows the same type of cost synergies than a full merger.
 18  In terms of policy 
implications, our results suggest that, for similar cost savings, SA should be favored over 
full merger by the competition authorities. 
We have presented the analysis in the framework of a parallel alliance (the 
collaborating airlines were supposed to initially operate on AB).  Note however that the 
                                                           
18 Note that it is not clear that the merger necessarily performs better in that respect than the SA.  Indeed, 
suppose that economies of aircraft size are the main source of cost saving associated with cooperation 
between airlines (i.e. the per-unit capacity cost is decreasing with the level of capacity).  In this case, the 
strategic advantage of the SA could very well be reinforced, since the alliance chooses more capacity than 
the merged entity, and most important, it creates an asymmetry with the rival.  Also, consider, for instance, 
that the three airlines are somewhat differentiated, and the uncertainty that they face contains an 
idiosyncratic component.  If airline 1’s idiosyncratic uncertainty is not perfectly correlated with that of firm 
2, forming a strategic alliance allows the two airlines to reduce the cost of holding excess capacity, like in 
Barla and Constantatos (2000).          - 10 -
same type of strategic effect should favor SA over merger in the case of a complementary 
alliance.  Indeed, suppose that airline 1 and 2 connect a third city H to cities A and B, 
respectively.  For some reason (e.g. regulatory constraint), they cannot serve AB directly 
but if they collaborate they can offer AB passengers to fly through H.  In choosing 
whether to merge or to form a SA, the strategic effect identified in our analysis remains 
present.
19  We can therefore conclude that, when cooperation is called for by either cost 
synergies or regulatory constraints, in the presence of outside rivals SA is profit superior 
to merger.    
                                                           
19 Obviously, airlines would also have to consider the impact of their decision on the other markets namely 
AH and BH.  However, since the SA makes the collaborating airlines more aggressive in terms of capacity 
choice, the SA should also be superior to the merger in improving their competitive positions into these 
other markets.     - 11 -
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Figure 2. The 
M A
3 3 Π − Π  difference for all admissible values of c. 
 




A K K − difference for all admissible values of c. 
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Figure 4. Difference (alliance-merger) in total surplus for all admissible values of c. 
 